EDITOR’S POSTSCRIPT: FROM THE VANTAGE POINT  OF CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY  OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY by MOU, BO
Comparative Philosophy 6.1 (2015)  EDITOR 
Comparative Philosophy Volume 6, No. 2 (2015): 58-66 
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 
www.comparativephilosophy.org 
 
 
EDITOR’S POSTSCRIPT: 
FROM THE VANTAGE POINT  
OF CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY  
OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
The current issue (volume 6, no. 2, July 2015) is a special-topic issue on “Cross-
tradition Engagement in Philosophy: Meta-Philosophical and Meta-Methodological 
Reflections”. The topic as a whole highlights one central concern of comparative 
philosophy and thus one of the major concerns of this journal, on meta-philosophical 
and meta-methodological exploration of how cross-tradition engagement in 
philosophy is possible, which addresses general theory and methodology of 
comparative philosophy (or doing philosophy “comparatively”). The discussion as 
presented in the current special-topic issue is especially relevant and engaging 
because of this: to have this journal with due focuses and emphases in the current 
prolific philosophy journal market and in view of the reflective need in the area, this 
journal is guided (in such aspects as submission topic and emphases, peer-review 
vantage point, etc.) by a general “constructive-engagement” strategy of comparative 
philosophy, as elaborated in the journal-theme-introduction essay.1  This general 
approach is an “open” strategy in two connections as suggested by its name. First, on 
the one hand, it is “constructively” open: it looks at distinct views on the issue of how 
cross-tradition engagement in philosophy is possible for a “constructive” purpose and 
in a “constructive” way (how we can learn from each other and jointly contribute to 
the common goal of contemporary development of philosophy and the development 
of contemporary society). Second, on the other hand, it is “open” in an engaging way: 
through criticism and self-criticism and philosophical argumentation to implement the 
foregoing “constructive” goal and way, instead of taking a passive and less-
philosophically-interesting “mere-tolerance” attitude. This “open” character brings 
about some organizational strategies of the journal content: besides those that appear 
in the regular “Article” parts, special sessions that explicitly generate such engaging 
discussions are also given in such forms as “constructive-engagement dialogue”, “the 
special-topic issue”, etc. This “Editor’s postscript” is intended to have the foregoing 
“open” character and provide engaging commentary on some of interesting points 
made in the contributing articles from the vantage point of the constructive-
engagement strategy of comparative philosophy, though this writing as an engaging 
                                                
1 Mou, Bo (2010), “On Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Comparative Philosophy: A Journal 
Theme Introduction”, Comparative Philosophy 1.1: 1-32 <http://www.comparative philosophy.org>. 
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commentary is not intended to be comprehensive and formal but selective in an 
“informal” style: I will not repeat all those important points that have been already 
well presented in the authors’ articles; rather I will focus only on some of them on 
which I intend to have a number of substantial “critical” comments, more or less, 
instead of “celebrating” ones that have been already suggested as they were selected 
to appear in this journal through various channels of peer-review process. 
  One more note on the subtitle of this writing ‘From the vantage point of 
constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy’. Though the above 
briefly explains how this strategy as a meta-meta-philosophy/methodology attitude is 
relevant and engaging here, there is another interesting aspect in which the 
“constructive-engagement strategy” is addressed in this postscript writing. It is not 
just a strategic attitude but also gives a working meta-methodological framework for 
evaluation and constructive engagement: the relevant resources can be used for the 
sake of effective evaluation and thus can be tested for their explanatory force. In my 
subsequent engaging comments, there is the need to reiterate certain relevant 
conceptual resources introduced earlier (in the journal-theme-introduction article) in 
order to refine understanding and have effective evaluation: among others, the 
distinction between methodological perspectives, methodological instruments, and 
methodological guiding principles, together with some implied methodological 
morals. It is known that the term ‘method’ or ‘methodological approach’ in 
philosophical inquiries can mean a number of things. Given that the term 
‘methodological approach’ means a way responding to how to approach an object of 
study, without due clarification and differentiation, the term might be used to mean 
one of the following three methodological ways or some of them simultaneously: a 
methodological perspective (or a perspective method), a methodological instrument 
(or an instrumental method), and/or a methodological guiding principle (or a guiding-
principle method). (1) Roughly speaking, a methodological perspective is a way of 
approaching an object of study and is intended to point to or focus on a certain aspect 
of the object and capture or explain that aspect in terms of the characteristics of that 
aspect, together with the minimal metaphysical commitment that there is that aspect 
of the object or that the aspect is genuinely (instead of being merely supposed to be) 
possessed by the object. There is a distinction between eligible and ineligible 
methodological perspectives concerning an object of study. If the aspect to which a 
methodological perspective is intended to point is genuinely possessed by the object 
of study, it is considered eligible in regard to that object. Otherwise, the 
methodological perspective is considered ineligible in regard to that object.2 (2) A 
methodological instrument is a way in which to implement, or give tools to realize, a 
certain methodological perspective. (3) A methodological guiding principle regulates 
                                                
2  It is noted there is the distinction between a methodological-perspective simplex and a 
methodological-perspective complex. A simplex is a single discernible methodological perspective, 
and a complex is either a combination of simplexes (“multiple perspective complex”) or an association 
of one perspective (simplex) with a certain methodological guiding principle (“guiding-principle-
associated perspective complex”). By “perspective” below I mean a methodological perspective 
simplex unless otherwise indicated. 
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and guides a certain methodological perspective (or perspectives) in regard to an 
object of study; presupposed by the agent, it implicitly guides and regulates how the 
perspective should be evaluated and used and contributes to the establishment of its 
desiderata (especially, the purpose and focus that it is to serve). There is the 
distinction between adequate and inadequate methodological guiding principles 
concerning methodological perspective(s) in regard to an object of study. 
Furthermore, I would like to call the readers’ attention to the adequacy conditions as 
given in the theme-introduction article, which together with the related resources 
suggests a meta-methodological framework by which to carry out the constructive 
engagement and evaluate its result. Given the above specifications, there are two 
preliminary points concerning the relation between a methodological perspective and 
a methodological guiding principle, which are especially relevant to the subsequent 
discussion. First, generally speaking, the merit, status, and function of a 
methodological perspective per se can be evaluated independently of a certain 
methodological guiding principle that the agent might presuppose in her actual 
application of the perspective. One’s reflective practice per se of taking a certain 
methodological perspective as one’s working perspective amounts to neither one’s 
losing sight of other genuine aspects of the object nor one’s rejecting other eligible 
perspectives in one’s background thinking nor presupposing an inadequate 
methodological guiding principle which would render ineligible other eligible 
methodological perspectives (if any). Second, however, it does matter whether one’s 
taking a certain methodological perspective is regulated by an adequate or inadequate 
guiding principle, especially for the sake of constructive engagement of seemingly 
competing approaches. When one’s application of an eligible methodological 
perspective as part of one’s reflective practice is guided by an adequate guiding 
principle and contributes to adequate understanding of the object of study, one’s 
application of that perspective would be philosophically constructive. 
 1. I have two major comments on Justin Smith’s article “Tradition, Culture, and 
the Problem of Inclusion in Philosophy”. Smith correctly points out Hegel’s 
evaluative attitude toward the identity of philosophy: it seems to Hegel, “[p]hilosophy 
comes into being in earnest when it becomes autonomous from the cultural life of its 
practitioners, and this in turn is possible only under historical conditions, such as 
those that first obtained in classical Greece, in which men experience themselves as 
free individuals.” [5].3 It is important to note that Hegel’s foregoing evaluative 
attitude is concerned with how to evaluate the relation between the autonomous 
approach in philosophical studies and the identity of philosophy, and this view is part 
of the “methodological guiding principle” dimension of his approach as a whole, 
which is distinct from the “perspective” dimension of his approach in which an 
“autonomous” perspective per se is taken. Smith also correctly identifies what is 
shared by Hegel, Gilbert Harman, and Margaret Wilson under his examination: 
“Harman and Hegel are in fact not so far apart: both take philosophy to be an 
                                                
3 The page numbers of the three authors’ citation references in the current issue are given in bracket 
parentheses. 
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autonomous discipline, unconnected to the study of culture. Wilson is not so far from 
them either: she recognizes that one has to engage with the efflorescences of culture –
not just “foreign” languages, but also, when necessary, literary forms such as the 
philosophical novel or poem—but only as a means to the end that she shares with 
Harman and Hegel alike: autonomous engagement with philosophical ideas.”[6] That 
is, what they share is the “autonomous” perspective in philosophical exploration, 
although they have their distinct “guiding principles” on how to look at the status and 
nature of this working perspective in view of other eligible perspectives. Now what is 
at issue is how to look at and evaluate the status of the autonomous approach per se 
as one perspective that is taken by many to be their working perspective in 
philosophical studies. My view is this. The merit, status, and function of the 
“autonomous” perspective per se can be evaluated independently of a certain 
methodological guiding principle that an agent (say, Hegel, Harman,4 or Wilson) 
might presuppose in her actual applications of the perspective; one’s reflective 
practice per se of taking the “autonomous” methodological perspective to look at the 
“autonomous” aspect (if any) of an object of study (as one’s working perspective) 
amounts to neither one’s losing sight of other genuine aspects of the object nor one’s 
rejecting other eligible perspectives in one’s background thinking nor presupposing 
an inadequate methodological guiding principle which would render ineligible other 
eligible methodological perspectives (if any). In this way, I think there is the need to 
be careful about exactly which part of Hegel’s approach under examination goes 
wrong: generally speaking, there is nothing wrong with taking the “autonomous” 
perspective per se when this perspective in looking at a certain object of study is 
eligible, even it can be expected and in need when one’s purpose and focus is on the 
“autonomous” aspect of the object; specifically speaking, there is nothing wrong with 
the “autonomous” perspective per se when it is used to point to the “autonomous” 
aspect that would be genuinely possessed by philosophical exploration and thus with 
the “autonomous” perspective dimension of Hegel’s approach as a whole; what is 
problematic lies in its treating the autonomous expectation as the exclusive or 
absolutely superior one. In other words, whether or not its “methodological guiding 
principle” dimension is adequate (arguably inadequate), its “perspective” dimension 
can be still eligible; whether or not a certain perspective can be taken to be one 
(eligible) working perspective in treating an object of study would be sensitive to 
                                                
4 Based on my own first-hand experience, I would like to say that, though persistently maintaining the 
“autonomous” perspective as his working perspective in his own philosophical exploration, Harman’s 
methodological guiding principle concerning how to look at the status of some other “perspective” 
approaches from other philosophical traditions in view of its relation to his own “autonomous” 
perspective seems to change in recent years. In the 2011 summer, I participated in Harman’s and Ernie 
Lepore’s jointly directed NEH Summer Seminar on Quine and Davidson at Princeton University. In a 
post-session workshop I presented a paper draft on how the constructive engagement between Quine’s 
naturalized epistemology and Zhuang Zi’s naturalism is possible; Harman not only attended this post-
session workshop, whose participation was not requited, but was also interested in the content of the 
paper and gave comments on scene. [The revised version of this paper was published in The 
Philosophical Challenge from China, edited by Brian Bruya (MIT Press; 2015), 303-337.] 
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one’s purpose and focus, to the context in which one’s reflective interest counts and 
to whether the object of study really possesses the aspect to which the perspective 
points and captures. 
  My second major comment on Smith’s article is concerned with the author’s 
ending point calling people to recognize that “the study of philosophy is, among other 
things, the study of culture” [7]. This dictum, on the one hand, hits the author’s point 
home to some extent, and on the other hand its expression as given above can be 
misleading. To be fair to the author, though using the period to end that dictum, Smith 
immediately has one substantial modification of the foregoing dictum: “Such a 
transformation, I maintain, is a necessary precondition of any future form of academic 
philosophy that will satisfy the current desideratum of greater inclusiveness.” (ibid., 
my emphasis in italics). The dictum reads more reasonable under this modification: 
that is, it is so when one takes a certain perspective, —call it a “culture” perspective 
concerning greater inclusiveness; my question here is then this: to have this claim 
nontrivial, one needs to first specify what is meant by ‘culture’ for the sake of greater 
inclusiveness: if it just means, say, a certain culture-bound natural language by which 
to linguistically express one’s philosophical thought, the statement is certainly 
trivially right; however, I believe the author means something more than mere 
culture-bound language but something non-linguistically cultural; then one might ask: 
when one’s focus is on some “non-cultural” aspect of the object of study that is in 
nature irrelevant to various specific cultural elements and thus takes an “autonomous” 
perspective, why does one then need to be indiscriminately expected to treat the 
mentioned “study of culture” as “a necessary precondition” for one’s reflection on 
that aspect even if one intends to include the relevant contributions from other 
philosophical traditions? I think that this would be one connection in which the author 
might consider further substantially refining his point. 
  2. In her article “It’s not Them, it’s You: A Case Study Concerning the Exclusion 
of Non-Western Philosophy?”, Amy Olberding makes her interesting and engaging 
challenge which begins with the following thoughtful observation and evaluative 
remarks [14-15]: 
 
There has of late been increasing attention in professional philosophy to the need to better 
include non-western philosophies in our discourse….At least some of the difficulty in 
incorporating non-western philosophy into western-dominated discourses results from a 
kind of double bind. To gain inclusion, non-western philosophies need effectively to hook 
in to existing issues, interests, or paradigms in the dominant discourse; non-western 
philosophies need to offer something that addresses the concerns and preoccupations 
western-trained philosophers find compelling and significant. However, where these 
philosophies do successfully hook in, this alone is rarely sufficient. Those scholars, for 
example, seeking to draw Buddhist no-self doctrines into contemporary discourses may be 
enjoined to explain just what Buddhist sources offer that Hume or Parfit do not already 
afford. Scholars working on virtue ethical interpretations of Confucian sources will need to 
demonstrate what the Confucians can philosophically accomplish that Aristotle cannot. 
Such is to say that even where non-western philosophical sources share common ground 
with western philosophies, that ground may yet be treated as fully occupied without them. 
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They will simply seem surplus to requirements….Failure to hook in to existing domains of 
inquiry or doing so in an unfamiliar style may awaken suspicion that here is something 
other than philosophy proper. The double bind for scholars who would promote interest in 
non-western traditions, then, can register as an importunate, impossible demand: Show us 
something we have not seen before, but be sure it looks well and truly familiar to us too. 
[My emphases in italics.] 
 
It is known that the constructive engagement strategy emphasizes the need to 
constructively engage on jointly concerned issues in philosophy; the foregoing cited 
remarks appear to also challenge this strategy in comparative philosophy in this 
connection to some extent: isn’t it that the constructive engagement strategy 
presupposes the “existing” identities of the issues? The constructive-engagement 
strategy has already had an explicit answer to such a question, as indicated in one of 
the suggested adequacy condition for methodological guiding principles (i.e., the 
new-eligible-perspective-possibility-recognizing condition)5: 
 
The new-eligible-perspective-possibility-recognizing condition: A methodological guiding 
principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to have an open-
minded attitude toward the possibility of a new eligible perspective that is to point to some 
genuine aspect of the object of study but has yet to be realized by the agent because of the 
‘unknown-identity’ status of that aspect. A methodological guiding principle is considered 
inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. 
 
Clearly, from the vantage point of the constructive-engagement strategy, the identity 
of a joint-concerned issue in philosophy is not determined by their “existing domain 
of inquiry” in philosophical studies:  the constructive engagement strategy does not 
take for granted the “existing” identity of what count as the jointly-concerned issues 
in philosophy: it resorts to neither the current agents’ subjective preferences nor the 
identity of “existing domain of inquiry”; rather, as highlighted in the foregoing “new-
eligible-perspective-possibility-recognizing” condition for the adequacy of 
methodological guiding principles in this connection, it has positively suggested some 
“objective” criterion for the identities of such issues that can be jointly-concerned 
(through philosophical interpretation). 6  In a recent elaboration of the adequacy 
conditions for a methodological guiding principle, a further condition, which is even 
more inclusive to explicitly cover those newly-developed aspect(s) of an object of 
study during the process of its dynamic development, has been suggested as follows7: 
                                                
5 Mou 2010, 20-21. 
6 Indeed, to my knowledge and my first-hand research in this area, many “transparently novel” issues 
turn out to be distinct aspects of either “old” issues or newly identified “jointly-concerned issues” 
through due philosophical interpretation. 
7 See Mou (2014), “Introduction to Part Two: Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental 
Approaches Beyond the Western Tradition”, in Bo Mou and Richard Tieszen eds (2014), Constructive 
Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy (Brill), 161. 
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The dynamic-development-sensitivity condition: A methodological guiding principle is 
considered adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to be sensitive to the dynamic 
development (if any) of an object of study for the sake of realizing and understanding 
which aspects are still genuinely possessed by the object (thus which methodological 
perspectives are still eligible) and which ones not (thus which perspectives not eligible 
anymore). In contrast, it is considered inadequate in this connection if otherwise. This 
adequacy condition calls the agent’s attention and sensitivity to this: during the process of 
the dynamic development (if any) of an object of study, the object might develop some new 
aspect(s) while losing some of its previous aspect(s); consequently, the methodological 
perspective with regard to the previous aspect of the object might be not absolutely or 
permanently eligible, and a previously ineligible perspective might become eligible because 
of its pointing to the new aspect. This adequacy condition highlights the need for the 
agent’s sensitivity to the dynamic development (if any) of the object of study, one 
important front which can be easily ignored by an agent who is guided by an inadequate 
methodological guiding principle in this connection. 
In this way, on the one hand, the constructive-engagement strategy does share the 
author’s sentiment in this connection: clearly, what counts as a jointly-concerned 
issue in philosophy is not determined by “[being] seen before…[their] look[ing] well 
and truly familiar to us too”. 
  On the other hand, it seems to me that the author’s foregoing cited remarks do 
include some sayings that could be more refined. Indeed, there is nothing wrong with 
the reflective practice per se (as one “perspective” approach in philosophical 
exploration) of engaging some issues in the “existing” domain of inquiry; such a 
“perspective” approach per se constitutes one constructive and promising connection 
of engagement. Rather, what is “possibly” wrong lies essentially in its agents’ 
(explicitly or implicitly) assumed “inadequate” methodological guiding principles (if 
any) that would treat this “perspective” approach as the exclusive one or the 
absolutely superior one. To this extent and in this sense, the “need” is in due place 
when one aims at focusing on the aspect of an object of study which such a 
“perspective” is to point to and capture and thus takes it to be her current working 
perspective. It is unclear how to understand the term ‘need’ in the author’s phrase 
‘[t]o gain inclusion, non-western philosophies need effectively to hook in to existing 
issues, interests, or paradigms in the dominant discourse’ here: would it mean that 
one needs to indiscriminately hook in to existing issues (thus involving some 
“inadequate” methodological guiding principle) or that one needs to do this (as one 
“perspective” approach which per se does not exclude any other eligible perspectives) 
when one sets out to focus on such an issue? Indeed, whether or not such a need is 
justified really depends on the purpose of a project. I think the author could further 
refine these sayings here to have a more distinctive treatment of those “western” 
scholars who are holding the foregoing “engagement” perspective but might have 
distinct methodological guiding principles, some of which are adequate while some 
others inadequate. 
  3. The coverage of Anand Vaidya’s article “Public Philosophy: Cross-Cultural 
and Multi-Disciplinary” is extensive and its contents are rich. Vaidya has suggested 
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his philosophically interesting and engaging conception of the “ACE” philosophy. 
According to Vaidya,  
 
.…by putting together Analytical philosophy, Comparative philosophy, and Experimental, 
or Empirically-Engaged, philosophy we are in a better position to do public philosophy that 
employs a wider set of tools from what we find in any of these kinds of philosophical 
methods taken alone. What we have is, ACE philosophy, where ‘analytical’ means nothing 
more than analysis by reflection on cases, ‘comparative’ means historically informed cross-
cultural and cross-traditional investigation, and ‘experimental or empirically-engaged’ 
refers either to: (i) running some kind of study on a population that uses an effective 
instrument, not necessarily surveys; or (ii) engaging empirical work, such as what we find 
in cognitive science, anthropology, psychology, or linguistics.” [55]  
 
Surely there would be various types of engagement combinations in comparative 
philosophy understood broadly, instead of one exclusive type. The reason for 
Vaidya’s selection of this specific engagement combination is related to his “public 
philosophy” concern and goal. I think such an engagement combination is well 
justified. On the other hand, I would like to consider how the identity of the ACE 
philosophy could be expanded in one substantial connection when some relevant 
strategic point of the constructive-engagement strategy is addressed. Let me start with 
one question which some of the interested readers might ask: could the ACE 
philosophy allow the due room for the constructive engagement between analytic and 
“Continental” approaches in philosophy which present two representative styles and 
orientation of doing philosophy and which have their distinct manifestations in some 
different culture-associated philosophical traditions, though currently they 
prominently manifest themselves in contemporary philosophy in the West? One 
consideration that would have such a question reasonable is this: the conception of 
comparative philosophy addressed in the ACE philosophy is the one in a narrow 
sense, i.e., that concerning only different culture-associated philosophical traditions,8 
instead of a broad sense in which the constructive engagement strategy of 
comparative philosophy is addressed. Indeed, from the vantage point of the 
constructive engagement strategy of comparative philosophy, ‘different philosophical 
traditions’ does not mean only those culture-associated philosophical traditions but 
also different traditions associated with distinct orientations/styles of doing 
philosophy, such as analytic tradition and “Continental” tradition in their broad senses; 
that is, we talk about different/various philosophical traditions, whether distinguished 
culturally or by style/orientation, instead of being limited to those culturally-
distinguished traditions. With the broadly understood identities of different 
philosophical traditions, the thus-expanded ACE philosophy could be more inclusive 
than what the ACE in its current identity would allow: for example, with analytic 
approach in philosophy as one engagement starting point, it can engage “Continental” 
                                                
8 As Vaidya indicates, “…by attending to cultures and traditions outside of western philosophy, ACE 
brings ideas and arguments into play that may have the ability to bring about a more diverse body of 
philosophers because the ideas are now being taken from different cultures and traditions.” [56] 
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approach in philosophy as a distinct tradition, whether these relevant “Continental” 
resources are from outside of or from within western philosophy.9 
 Vaidya delivers his ending point in the foregoing ending section this way: “…we 
might need to be more inclusive, so that our engagement with justice, knowledge, and 
beauty takes into account potentially different points of view.” [57] The ending point 
here as a general call is worth further explanation: would “any different views” go? 
Would there be any criterion for this? In this connection, the constructive engagement 
approach has an explicit standard via its conception of eligible perspectives—only 
those different but “eligible” perspectives go, instead of “anything goes”. Though 
there has yet to be a further clarification and explanation of the ending phrase ‘takes 
into account potentially different points of view’ with regard to the foregoing concern, 
I think that Vaidya’s sample examinations of a number of concrete case analyses in 
the preceding discussion in his article have shown an orientation that seems to be 
essentially in the “eligibility” direction, instead of “any different views go”. 
Nevertheless, theoretically speaking, I think this “criterion” issue needs to be 
explicitly addressed to enhance the author’s general ending point. In this connection, 
the constructive-engagement strategy, as mentioned above, does give an answer via 
its conception of eligible perspectives; it expects a further engagement on this issue 
(including criticism of its own view on this). 
  Indeed, due to its foregoing general features, the constructive-engagement 
strategy of comparative philosophy is intrinsically open and constructive; its distinct 
meta-philosophical and meta-methodological part is open to further engagement and 
constructive dialogue, like what the three authors and the journal editor carry out 
through this specific topic issue.10 
 
 
Bo Mou 
July 2015 
 
 
                                                
9 For more detailed explanation in this connection, see the “Intro” etc. in Bo Mou & Richard Tieszen 
eds. (2014), Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy: From 
the Vantage Point of Comparative Philosophy (Brill). 
10 I would like to express my thanks to Dean Paul Dominguez and Xiaojun Ding for their helpful 
suggestions on some language expressions in this writing. 
